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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\V ALTER ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARD-
~IAN AFTO SALES, NATHAN 
CHILD and BARRUS M 0 T 0 R 
CO:.\IPANY, 
Defendants and Appellant . .:;, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
ARTHUR HARDMAN 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driving 
a 1951 International Pickup truck east on Highway 40, 
approximately ten miles west of Salt Lake City when 
the vehicle suddenly veered from the south side of the 
highway to the north side where it collided with an 
automobile driven by one George Williams in which 
the plaintiff was riding, resulting in severe injuries to 
plaintiff and Child. 
The plaintiff sought to recover damages against 
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Nathan Child, Arthur Hardman, dba Hardman Auto 
Sales, and Barrus l\1:otor Company. The suit was brought 
against Hardman as a defendant upon the theory that 
Child was his servant or agent and against Barrus 
Motor Company upon the theory that the .steering apar-
atus and the wheels of the vehicle were in a defective 
condition, which the Barrus l\fotor Company knew or 
should have known. 
The allegations of negligence were denied by all 
three defendants. Hardman also denied that Child was 
his agent or servant. A jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants Hardman 
and Child in the sum of $5,632.00. 
This appeal is taken by the defendant Hardman 
upon the grounds that there was no evidence to go to 
the jury on the issue of whether Child was his servant 
or agent and that his motion for a directed verdict of 
No Cause of Action made at the close of the evidence 
should have been granted. Defendant Hardman also con-
tends that the court erroneously gave certain instruc-
tions and refused to give others. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Arthur Hardn1an is a resident of 
Sunset, Utah, where he operated a garage and used 
car lot (R. 91). The defendant Child had known Hard-
man for s01ne time before December 20, 1955 (the date 
of the accident). They had done busine.ss together in 
the past. 
Some wf'ekfi before Dece1nber 20th Child informed 
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Hardman that he was interested in buying a used pick-
up truck (R. 83). Sometime after, and a few days before 
December 20th, Hardman told Child that he thought he 
had located a pickup in Tooele, Utah, which might inter-
est him. Arrangements were made for Child to accom-
pany Hardman on a trip to Tooele in order that he could 
see the vehicle (R. 83). They traveled to Tooele in Hard-
man's wrecker. Child paid no part of the trip expense 
(R. 84). Arrived at Barrus Motor Company .at about 
10:00 o'clock A.M. (R. 96). The vehicle they were inter-
ested in was not there when they first arrived but was 
returned to Barrus Motor Company about one hour 
later. 
Child was interested in the vehicle and in order to 
ascertain its mechanical condition Hardman and Child 
both drove it (R. 97). They noticed that the window 
was defective, the speedometer did not work and that 
the oil pressure was low. There may have been one 
or two other minor defects (R. 98). Hardman noticed 
nothing unusual in the steering mechanism or the way 
the vehicle drove (R. 97). Child s.aid that he would take 
the truck if the defects which they noticed were repaired 
(R. 84 and 98), which was done by Barrus Motor to 
Child's satisfaction (R. 90 and 98). 
The purchase price agreed on by Hardman and Child 
was $650.00 plus the turn-in value of Child's '41 truck 
(R. 86, 87 .and 94). Hardman would not have purchased 
the truck from Barrus Motor if Child hadn't told him 
that he would buy it from him as Hardman didn't want 
to pay property tax on it, which would have been due 
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.January 1, 1956 (R. 85 and 94). Hardman paid Barrus 
Motor $600.00 for the pickup (R. 92). They delivered 
to him the Certificate of Title, a Bill of Sale and a 
receipt for the $600.00 payment (R. 92 and 93) but not 
the Registration Certificate (R. 95) which they were 
unable to locate. These documents were not delivered 
by Hardrnan to Child, which would have been done when 
they returned to Sunset (R. 93 and 99). Other than the 
paper work the deal between Child and Hardman was 
completed verbally before they left Tooele on the return 
trip (R. 94). 
When the~· were ready to leave Tooele Hardman 
delivered possession of the pickup to Child (R. 95). 
Child said that he would follow Hardman in the pickup 
truck and Hardman suggested that they occasionally 
pass each other on the ·way back so that if either had 
trouble the other would know about it (R. 87 and 208). 
Child put Hardman's Dealer's License Plates on the 
pickup truck before they left Tooele (R. 91). After 
leaving Tooele on the return trip Hardn1an stopped 
at Mills Junction to check the cables on the Yehicle he 
w.as towing (R. :205). Child stopped behind him. After 
resu1ning the trip Child had passed Hardman once, and 
had passed hiln the second tinw when the accident 
happened (R. 209. 217 -:219). 
Hardn1an did not purrhase the gasoline for the 
pickup truck (R. -J-l.t ). nor did he pay or .agree to pay 
Child any eompensation. 
4 
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STA':PE~[]~XT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS NOT DRIV-
lNG SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCI-
DENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS BY SUB-
MITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH WERE NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND BY FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT 
HARDMAN'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS NOT DRIV-
ING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCI-
DENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
If liability is to be irnposed upon Hardman because 
of the negligence of Child it rnust be upon some theory 
under which Hardman exercised the control or had the 
right to control the manner in which Child drove the 
vehicle. Plaintiff alleges in his cornplaint that Child 
was the servant or agent of Hardman. 
Considering first whether the relationship was 
master and servant, the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency, Yolume 1, Section 220 defines a servant as 
follows: 
'' (1) A servant is a person employed to per-
form service for another in his affairs and who, 
with respect to his physical conduct in the per-
formance of the service, is subject to the other's 
control or right to control." 
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There was certainly no evidence that Child was 
employed by Hardman. He was paid no compensation 
for traveling to Tooele or driving the pickup truck on 
the return trip. In the recent case of Oberhansley 'VS. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P. 2d 1093, ____________ Utah 
____________________ , one of the questions involved was whether 
Oberhansley was the employee of one Pearce, for whom 
he was driving a car to Evanston, Wyoming from Ogden. 
Pearce had given him $10.00 for traveling expense. The 
former testified at the trial that if he had seen Ober-
hansley driving the car in the manner which might 
result in damage to it, he felt that he could tell him 
not to do so inasmuch as the car was his responsibility. 
In holding that the relationship 'Yas not master and 
servant this court quoted from the decision of Bingham 
City, et al. vs. Industrial Commission, 66 rtah 390, 24:3 
P. 113, on page 393, as follows: 
"The usual test by which to determine whether 
one person is another's employe is whether the 
alleged employer possesses the power to control 
the other per.son in respect to the services per-
formed by the latter and the power to discharge 
him for disobedience or misconduct. Under the 
Workmen's Compensation ~\ct it is also essential 
that some consideration be in fact paid or payable 
to the employe. The purpose of the act is to pro-
vide compensation for earning power lost in in-
dustry, and the only basi.s for computing compen-
sation is the earning ability of the muploye in 
the particular e1nployment out of which the loss 
arises. In short, the term 'en1ploye' indicates a 
person hired to work for wa~es as the employer 
may direct ... '' 
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The evidence is even more clear in this ca.se that 
Child was not the employee or servant of Hardman. 
\Vas the relationship between Hardman and Child 
that of principal and agent J? Agency is defined in the 
Restatement of the Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Section l, 
as follows: 
"(1) Agency is the relationship which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf 
and subject to his control, and consent by the 
other so to act. 
"(2) The one for whom action is to be taken 
is the principal. 
"(3) The one who is to act is the agent." 
In the case of Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 
P. 2d 1049, Justice \Volfe said: 
"The test of whether one is the agent of the 
other depends upon the right of control of one 
over the other. The same principles of .agency 
apply to the running of an automobile as apply 
to any other field of action. The fact that the 
automobile is capable of causing so much damage 
has led the court, sometimes unwillingly, to de-
part from the fundamental principles of principal 
and agent in order to hold owners responsible, 
the thought in the minds of the court being that 
more responsibility should be visited upon the 
owner of such an instrument because of the 
potentialities of mischief." 
* * * * * 
"Many cases have loosely used such expres-
sions such as 'for and on behalf,' or 'in the busi-
ness of,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated before, 
the inquiry must be directed to the question of 
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agency in the operation of the car rather than 
to the question of agency for the accomplishment 
of some ultimate purpose." 
In the case of Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 rtah 12 
' 207 P. 2d 809, a boy in the Army reque_sted his father 
and mother to bring his car to him, and the other was 
injured in an accident while the father was driving the 
car to the army camp \vhere the boy was stationed. The 
mother subsequently brought an action against the boy 
upon the theory that the father was the agent or ser-
vant of the defendant. 
"* * * 'An agent u.Jw is not subject to control 
as to the manner in u.Jz iclz he performs the acts 
that constitute the execution of his agency is in 
a similar relation to the principal as to such 
conduct as one who agrees only to accomplish 
mere physical results. For the purpose of deter-
mining liability, they are both 'independent con-
tractors' and do not cause the person for whom 
the enterprise is undertaken to be responsible 
* * *.' (Emphasis ours.) 
"If respondent had no right of control over 
the driver of his car, the court did not err in 
directing a verdict of no cause of action. ~\.s 
shown above, a principal cannot be held respon-
sible for the torts of his agent where he has no 
right of control over that agent.·· 
One of the factors to he considered in detennining 
whether liardn1an had any right of control oyer the 
pickup i~ whether he wa~ the owner of the vehicle, or 
to Rtate it othPrwi~P. \\·hether there had been a sale of 
the vehicle to Child. 
Tn this in~tmwe Wf' ar<' dealing with a sp{\cific piece 
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of property, that is, a pickup automobile. All of the 
repairs to the automobile had been made, that is, the 
automobile had been put in a deliverable state (R. 84, 
90, 98) and the purchase price had been agreed upon 
(R. 86-88). Except for the necessary paper work and 
the actual payrnent of the purchase price, everything 
that was agreed to be done had been done and the trans-
action was cmnplete (R. 94-95, 98). Hardman did not 
want to buy the pickup truck from Barrus unless Child 
would take it, as he had no market for it, and didn't 
want to pay the property tax which would be levied on 
the vehicle on January 1, 1956 ( R. 84-85, 94). This being 
the case, ownership of the specific property had passed 
from Hardman to the defendant, X athan Child, prior 
to the time the parties left Tooele. Sections 60-2-2 and 
60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to the trans-
fer of property and title so far as those sections are 
applicable to this situation provide: 
"60-2-2. Property and specific goods passes 
when parties so intend. ( 1) Where there is .a 
contract to sell specific or ascertained good.s, the 
property in them is transferred to the buyer .at 
such time as the parties to the contract intend 
it to be transferred. 
"(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the 
intention of the parties, regard shall be had to 
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the 
parties, usages of trade and the circumstances 
of the case. 
"60-2-3. Rules for ascertaining intention.-
Unless a different intention appears, the fol-
lowing are rules for ascertaining the intention 
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of the parties as to the time at which the property 
and the goods is to pass to the buyer; 
"Rule ( 1) Where there is an unconditional 
contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable 
state, the property in the goods passes to the 
buyer when the contract is made, and it is im-
material whether the time of payment, or the 
time of delivery, or both, is postponed. 
"Rule ( 4) • • • 
(b) Where in pursuance of a contract to 
sell the seller delivers the goods to the buyer, 
or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named 
by the buyer or not) for the purpo.se of trans-
mission to or holding for the buyer, he is pre-
sumed to have unconditionally appropriated the 
goods to the contract, except in cases provided 
for in the next rule and in Section 60-2-4. (Rule 
5 and Section 60-2-4 not applicable). * * *" 
In Jones v. C. I. Trust. 64 rtah 151. 228 P. 896, 
Jones owned a Chandler car. He left it with the X aylor-
W oodruff Motor Company with authority given the 
Motor Company to sell it for $1,500.00. There was a 
Cleveland car, the only one of its kind then on the floor 
of the Motor Con1pany showroom. Jones and his son 
inspected the Cleveland ear and declared they would 
buy it if the Chandler car could be sold for the price 
named, and the l\1:otor Company was authorized, in the 
event of the sale of the Chandler car, to apply the pur-
chase price on the price of the Cleveland car and Jones 
was to pay in addition the su1n of $375.00. Says the 
court: 
" A sale involves a present transfer of the 
10 
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title in the goods from the seller to the buyer. 
A contract to sell implies that the titlP. in the 
goods remains vested in the seller and is to be 
transferred to the buyer at some future time. 
\Vhether a contract is one of sale or an executory 
contr.act to sell depends always upon what the 
parties to it intend in regard to the time when 
the title in the property is to go to the buyer. 
If they intend the title to be transferred when 
the contract is made, it is a contract of sale; 
otherwise it is a contract to sell. The intention 
of the parties is the important and controlling 
fact to be considered and given effect in deter-
mining the nature of ,a contract in this regard. 
There may be a sale, a present passing of the 
title, notwithstanding that hy the terms of the 
agreement the right to the possession of the thing 
sold is retained by the seller until the purchase 
price is paid. The intention must be determined 
from a consideration of the nature and terms 
of the contract, usages of trade, the conduct of 
the parties and the circumstances of the case. 
If no contrary intention appears from such a 
consideration, then the law presumes, u:here the 
contract pertains to a specific chattel, in a delivP r-
able state, that the parties intend the title to 
pass when the contract is made, and this is true 
regardless of the fact that payment of the price 
or delivery of the goods, or both, be postponed. 
The foregoing propositions are elementary. 
They are to be found in the provisions of the 
1Jniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1917, 
ss. 5110, 5127, 5128, Rule 1 (citing ca~P~.) 
* * * 
"The parties to the contract now under con-
sideration seem not to have expressed any inten-
tion whatever in regard to when the title in the 
new Cleveland sedan should vest in Jones. They 
lt 
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say nothing about that matter in the conversation 
on the morning of October 8th, nor in any of 
the correspondence which passed between them. 
Jones agreed, in effect, that he would buy the 
new sedan and pay $1875.00 for it, if and when 
the sales company sold his old car for $1500.00 
net to him, the proceeds of the .sale to that amount 
to apply upon the price of the new car, and that 
he would pay the balance of $375.00 when he 
took possession of the new car. Both parties 
understood and intended that the sales company 
should retain the right to the possession of the 
sedan until the entire purchase price was paid. 
The company did sell the old car for more than 
the amount which Jones asked for it and received 
the money, so that Jones, as a result of that trans-
action, in fact paid $1500.00 which is all that 
he claims in this action, toward the price of the 
new sedan. To all intents and purposes, the situ-
ation was then the same as if Jones had stepped 
into the sales company's office and handed over 
$1500.00 in money as a part paYJ.nent on the 
automobile, then on exhibition in the showroom, 
and said that he would return within a few days 
and pa~T the balance of $375.00 and take the new 
car.'' 
In the ra~e of Da ris r. Semloh Hotel, Inc .. 86 rtah 
318, -t-t P. (:2) 689, an e1nployer agreed to repurchase 
s01ne shares of stock in the eYent the e1nployee was 
discharged fr01n his e1nployn1ent. Say~ the Court: 
"Under the terms of the contract, whether 
or not the property in the stock passed to the 
buyer, the defendant was bound by his contract 
to repurehase and pay for the stork. The appel-
lant having refused to pay for the stork according 
to the term~ of the eonb~act, the seller had the 
1:2 
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right to maintain his action for the agreed price. 
The transaction did not contemplate an option 
on the part of the defendant to repurchase the 
stock, nor did it constitute what might be deter-
mined an offer to purchase the stock. It w.as a 
binding contract upon both parties subject only 
to a condition subsequent, viz., the discharge of 
the plaintiff from the employment contemplated 
in the contract. Thi.s condition subsequent having 
been fulfilled in the discharge of the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff having made tender of the stock, 
there would seem to be no good reason why he 
should not recover. It 1ras the clear intention of 
the parties that the title to the stock should pass 
to the defendant upon the happening of the events 
as outlined upon which the defendant became 
bound to pay." 
The evidence of a present sale and transfer of the 
title to the property is even stronger in this case than 
in the two preceding cases referred to for the reason 
that there was no condition subsequent upon which the 
title to the automobile should pass, such as the sale of 
another automobile or the discharge of an employee, 
but rather it was intended by the parties that the owner-
ship should pass at the time possession was surrendered 
which occurred prior to the time the parties left Tooele 
and before thi.s accident occurred. It may be anticipated 
that the plaintiff will contend that no present transfer 
of the possession of the automobile was made at the 
time the automobile was delivered in view of Section 
41-1-72, Utah Code Annotated, which provides that title 
to an automobile shall be deemed not to have passed 
until the title is transferred in accordance with the re-
1~ 
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quirements of the motor vehicle law. This argument 
is met by the case of Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 
89 P. ( 2) 235. In that case, T. F. Jackson was the regis-
tered owner of a Dodge car, wh1ch Alice C. Jackson 
f•laimed was given to her by T. F. Jackson as a wedding 
present. There was no transfer of the ownership certifi-
cate by the State Tax Commission and, therefore, defend-
ant, the adminstrator of J ackson'.s Estate, claimed that 
Alice was not the O"\\-ller of the car in the absence of 
such a transfer. He therefore refused to deliver the 
car to her. The court rejected this contention and de-
clared: 
"But, argues appellant, even though the evi-
dence shows a gift of the car to the plaintiff, 
yet the gift is void in law because the ownership 
registration was not. transferred in the office of 
the State Tax Commission. In support of this 
proposition they cite Section 71, Chapter 46, Laws 
of Utah 1935, and the case of Schwartz v. \Yhite, 
80 Utah 150, 13 P. (2) 643. Appellant however, 
misconstrues both the effect of the statute and 
the import of the decision. The statute cited 
reads: 
"'Section 71: 
"'Until the department shall haYe issued such 
new certificate of registration and certificate of 
ownership, deliYery of any vehicle required to 
be registered .shall be deen1ed not to haYe passed, 
and said intended transfer shall be dee1ned to 
be incomplete and not to be valid or effective 
for any purpose except as provided in Section 
76 of the Act.· Be it noted that the section does 
not .apply to all vehieles, but only to those re-
f!Uirerl to hP rPp;istererl. Ry Rertion 19, before a 
1-t 
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motor vehicle can be driven upon a public high-
way, it must be registered. By Section 61, the 
transfer or assignment of title to a car auto-
Inatically terminates the registration. Section 63 
provides that the transferee of title to a car, 
before operating such vehicle on a highway shall 
secure a new registration of title, thus recog-
nizing that he gets the title without transfer of 
registration. Section 66 further supports this view 
and section 67 contains this significant provision: 
" 'F pon .any such transfer a new owner may 
either secure a new registration and certificate 
of title on proper application, upon presentation 
of s~tch instntments or documents of authority 
or certified copies thereof as may be sufficient 
or required by law to evidence or effect a trans-
fer of the title or interest in or to chattels. In 
such case, where such new owner, upon transfer-
ring his title or interest to another person shall 
execute and acknowledge an assignment and 
warranty of title and deliver the same, .also the 
documents of authority or certified copies there-
of as ma)~ be sufficient required by law to evi-
dence the right of such person, to the person to 
whom such transfer is made.' 
"Section 69 provides for transfer of regis-
tration in certain cases by affidavit. It seen1s 
therefore that Section 71 is not to be construed, 
as contended by appellant, as absolute and manda-
tory to pass a title. In the light of the whole 
chapter, it is evident that its provisions were 
written to protect innocent purchasers and third 
parties frorn fraud, but was not intended to be 
controlling as between the parties to the trans-
action. It may well be doubted that the Legislature 
could make mandatory any such formalities as 
]5 
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a prerequisite to transfer of title as betweeJJ 
the parties. It can, of course, pre.scribe such ruleE 
to be effective as to third parties and it may 
perhaps provide that the registered title shall 
be an element in determining liability for dam-
ages resulting from the operation of the car as 
indicated by Section 76. ' 
"Let us now devote a few minutes to a more 
particular analysis of Section 71, the section 
upon which appellant relies. It will be noted 
from the italicized portion of the section quoted, 
supra, that the title shall be deemed to be incom-
plete. These provisions are not absolute, manda-
tory or controlling in their application. They do 
not confer or deny substantive rights. They are 
procedural or evidentiary in nature. They provide 
a flag of warning to prospective trasferees or 
encumbrancers, much as do the registery acts 
relative to real estate or chattel mortgages. Such 
was the effect given the statute in Schwartz Y. 
White, 80 Utah 150, 30 P. (2) 643." 
So it is seen that the fact that certificate of title 
was not delivered to Child at the time the possession 
df the auton1obile was turned over to hi1n is not im-
portant or detern1inative of whether or not ownership 
of the vehicle passed for the reason that the statute 
was not intended to prescribe the tinw ownership should 
pass between the parties. but rather to protect third 
parties, who relying upon public records Inight seek to 
purchase the autmnobile. 
The following citation eontains the intin1ation that 
the Legislature n1ight provide that the registration title 
shall be an elen1en t in detennining lia hili ty frmu dan1ages 
resulting frmn the operation of the car. This intiination 
16 
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stems from what is now Section -U-1-77, which reads: 
"The owner of a motor vehicle who has 
made a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or 
interest and who has delivered possession of such 
vehicle and certificate of registration and certifi-
cate of title thereto properly endorsed to the 
purchaser or transferee, shall not be liable for 
any damages thereafter resulting from the negli-
gent operation of such vehicle by another.'' 
It will be noted that the statute does not declare 
that if there is no physical transfer of the title papers 
to the buyer, the seller will be liable for the negligence 
of the buyer; it merely .states that if the car has been 
delivered to the buyer and with it the certificate of 
registration .and certificate of title properly endorsed, 
the seller is no longer liable for damages to the buyer 
(even though no new certificate has been issued to the 
buyer). It is submitted that this supports the position 
which we have taken herein that the actual tr.ansfer 
of title by the State Tax Commission is not a prerequisite 
to the passing of title. This statute was probably .adopted 
from California which has an "ownership liability law," 
providing that the owner of a vehicle is liable for injury 
or damage up to the sum of $5,000.00, resulting from 
the negligence of another in driving the automobile. It 
was designed to relieve the vendor from the liability 
imposed by this statute, which has not been adopted in 
Utah. This position and the holding of Jones v. C. I. 
Trust Company, supra, was reaffirmed in the latter 
case of Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah (2) 259, 282 P. 
( 2) 833, where our court again recognizes that the 
17 
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delivery of the certificate of title properly endorsed 
is not essential to a valid sale of an automobile. In 
that case wholesale automobile dealers in New :Mexico 
and Colorado sold automobiles to a licensed used auto-
mobile dealer in Utah, who gave drafts to the wholesale 
dealers and foreign certificates of title showing the 
wholesale dealers to be the owners were attached to 
the drafts as security, and the used automobile dealer ; 
transported the automobile to his used automobile lot 
and sold them in the usual course of business for a 
valuable consideration, without ever having paid the 
drafts and without receiving certificate of title. It was 
held that the wholesale dealers were estopped to assert 
their title to the automobiles in replevin actions against 
the purchaser. The plaintiffs in that case relied upon 
the same section, now Section 41-1-72, but the Supreme 
Court held that the section was not applicable and that 
the buyers from the used car lot dealer secured a valid 
title. 
We anticipate that plaintiff will contend that Hard-
man attempted to exercise control over the n1anner in 
which Child drove the vehicle because of statements 
before leaving Tooele to the effect that they should 
pass one .another occasionally on the return trip, so 
that if either had trouble the other would be apprised 
of it. 
The first witnef'f'. l\Ir. Child, who was ealled by 
plaintiff's counsel under Rule 43 (b). testified in that 
examination as fo1lows: 
18 
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"Q. You and he talked about the trip going 
back, is that right~ I me.an, while you were there 
in Tooele, you talked about going back to Sunset"? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Were you going to stop in Salt Lake~ 
"A. There was nothing mentioned of stopping 
at Salt Lake. 
"Q. Did he say that you could drive the pick-
up~ 
* * * * 
"Q. Was there any conversation .about who 
was to drive the pick-up~ 
"A. I was to drive the pick-up and he was to 
drive his wrecker truck. 
Q. Who was present at the time that was 
said~ 
"A. Well, nobody but Mr. Hardman and I, 
that I c.an remember of. 
"Q. And who said it; did he say it or did you~ 
"A. Well, he says, 'You drive the pick-up, 
and I'll drive the other truck.' 
"Q. And the 'other truck,' did that have also 
-that had a jeep attached to it that he was 
taking up to Sunset~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And did he .also say to you that he 
thought that wha;t you should do was to keep 
passing each other so both of you would know 
that each of you was all right, and your car 
was all right~ 
"A. Yes, sir." (R. 80-81) 
19 
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On cross-examination of Child by defendant Hard-
man's counsel, he testified as follows: 
"Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Hardman 
that you would follow him in the pick-up truck~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And you recall him saying, in substance, 
that, generally, on those trips, you would pass 
each other, so, if there was anything wrong with 
either car, the other one would know about it¥ 
"A. Yes, sir." (R. 87) 
Hardman testified on cross-examination by plain-
tiff's counsel as follows: 
"Q. As I understand it, before you had left 
the place down there at Barrus ~fotor Company 
in Tooele, you agreed you would keep in contact 
with each other as you go along the highway? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Hadn't you told Mr. Child that you would 
continue passing one another, so that you would 
know that you were all right? 
"A. No, sir; I suggested that we did that at 
times. 
"Q. Well, then, did you say to him, 'That 
is what we will do' Y 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Well, did you have a conversation with 
him about that subject Y 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Where? 
"A. Before we started. 
20 
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"Q. Who was present~ 
"A. That, I couldn't .answer. 
"Q. What was said~ 
"A. I suggested we pas.s one another occa-
sionally- or that we did pass one another occa-
sionally when we were out on trips of this order. 
"Q. And did you say anything .about stopping 
at the junction there between the road that goes 
to Grantsville and Tooele~ 
"A. Not that I recall." (R. 208) 
There is nothing inconsistant in the foregoing testi-
mony with Child's ownership and control of the pickup 
truck It is significant that when Hardman did not give 
.any instructions to Child about stopping at :Mills J unc-
tion (R. 208) Childs stopped behind him of his own 
volition and not in compliance with a signal from Hard-
man (R. 82). While they were stopped Hardman did 
not examine the vehicle Child was driving (R. 209). 
Nor did he talk to Child about the route they would 
follow on the return trip (R. 213). Hardman checked 
to see if the cables on the vehicle he w.as towing were 
in order while at Mills Junction (R. 205). Hardman 
did not purchase the gasoline for the pickup (R. 414). 
In common every day experience, when persons are 
driving separate vehicles some distance to a common 
destination, it is not unusual for them to keep in touch 
with each other .as a precautionary measure so that 
one can assist the other if the need arises. However, 
such an arrangement does not necessarily mean that 
either has the right to control the manner in which the 
other drives his particular vehicle. 
21 
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The evidence seems clear that there was a com-
pleted transfer of the International Pickup to Child 
from Hardman hefore the accident, and because of that 
sale Hardman had no right of control over the automo-
bile, nor did he attempt to exercise control over the 
manner in which Child drove it. That bv reason thereof 
. ' 
there can be no imputation of any negligence on the part 
of Child to Hardman, however, anticipating arguments · 
of Court, let us assume that the sale was not complete 
when Hardman and Child left Tooele, and that Child's 
category wa~ that of a prospective purchaser of the 
pickup. In this connection it should be noted that Child 
at the time of the accident had exclusive possession 
and control of the vehicle. This being true, the general 
rule as announced in an annotation on the dealer's 
liability for the negligent operation of a car by a pros-
pective purchaser found at 31 A. L. R. (2) 1-!-15 applies. 
That general rule is announced as follows: ~ 
"Two basic rules regarding the liability of 
an automobile dealer for the negligent operation 
by a pro.spective purchaser, or one acting for 
hiln, of .a car owned by the dealer, appear im-
mediately fron1 the n1ost cursory inspection of 
the cases. The first of these is that the dealer 
is not liable if the negligent operation occurs 
while the purchaser~ or the person acting in his 
stead, is driving the car unaccon1panied by the 
dealer or anY representatiYe of the dealer. In 
such cases, it. is generally said that the relation-
ship of 1naster and serYant or principal and agent 
does not exist between the dealer .and the driver. 
The relationship is said to be, instead. one of 
bailment, with resulting applicability of the rule 
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that a bailor (i.e., the dealer) is not liable for 
the negligence of his bailee (i.e., the prospective 
purchaser). As stated by one court, when .a pros-
pective purchaser 'accepts the use of a car in 
such circumstances, he acts solely for his own 
benefit. His object is to satisfy himself as to 
the quality of the car in which he is interested. 
He is no more the agent of the seller than is 
the man who tests the weight of .a piece of goods 
the agent of his tailor or the man who thumps 
a melon the agent of the grocer. In each case 
the test may result indirectly in benefiting the 
seller, but this benefit is merely a coincidence 
entirely· unrelated to the purpose of the tester.' " 
This rule appears to be generally .accepted and 
rs supported by case~ cited from a substantial number 
(seventeen) of states. 
It may be assumed that plaintiff will argue that 
Hardman .and Child were engaged in a joint venture 
and, therefore, the negligence of Child may be imputed 
to Hardman. They are expected to assert that the two 
parties had a common destination and Hardn1an w.as 
the owner of the vehicle. 
In the case of Derrick rs. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry. 
Co., 50 Utah· 573, 168 P. 335, the plaintiff brought an 
action against the defendant railway company for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a crossing accident. The 
undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff and the owner 
of the autornohile had agreed upon a trip in which they 
were to share expenses equally. This court in holding 
that it w.as error to instruct that plaintiff was a pas-
senger because he was a joint adventurer said: 
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"* * * Th a· a ·a h e un 1spute ev1 ence s ows that 
the a_utomobile trip was a joint affair in which 
~erntt and plaintiff were mutually and equally 
Interested, and in which their rights to direct 
and govern the conduct of each other in relation 
thereto were coextensive. Each had a voice and 
the right to be heard in regard to the details of 
the trip. Merritt testified that 'the arrangements 
were equal; that is, they were mutual among us 
all.' He further testified : 'When we started we 
had agreed to take lots of time and not drive fast. 
We discussed this on the way out,' and that 'it 
was clearly understood' that each would pay his 
share of the expenses of the trip. Plaintiff testi-
fied that costs of the trip included gasoline, oil, 
tires, 'wear and tear on the car, and other ex-
penses connected with the trip.' 
"The contractural relations of plaintiff and 
his traveling companions were substantially the 
same as they would have been if they jointly . 
hired an automobile with which to make the trip, 
with the understanding that they would jointly 
pay the expenses and Inutually and concurrently 
direct the journey and the details thereof. The 
trip was therefore a joint enterprise in which 
these parties had a connnunity of interest and 
in which they all equally had a voice and a right 
to be heard respecting the details of the journey. 
Under these circuinstances the negligence of Mer-
ritt in the n1anage1nent of the automobile at the 
time of the collision was iiuputed to plaintiff.'' 
See also- tlw eat:'e of Fo.rlcy rs. Gallagher~ 55 rtah 298, 
185 P. 77, in whieh it was held that a joint enterprise 
between the driYcr and tht:" occupants of the car did 
not exist for the reason ·that the occupants had nothing 
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whatever to do with the control or management of the 
auton1obile. 
The basis for a joint venture existing between parties 
is contractual and for the driving of an automobile 
to be part of the venture, the automobile must be used 
in furtherance of the business objective provided for 
in the contractual arrangement. 
This Court in the case of Bates vs. Simpson, (Utah) 
239 P. 2d 749, 121 Utah 165, which involved the question 
of whether two used car dealers who shared a lot, the 
building thereon and its furnishings and the use of the 
telephone were joint adventurers, s.aid: 
"* * * We have frequently announced in this 
court that 'joint adventure is in the nature of 
partnership,' Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v. 
Lewis & Sharp, 8-l Utah 347, 35 P. 2d 835; Kau-
mans v. White Star G.as & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 
63 P. 2d 231. To establish a joint adventure there 
must be an agreement, express or implied, for 
the sharing of profits, 30 Am. Jur. p. 682." 
This rule is applicable to this situation. The £act 
that an automobile accident is involved should make 
no difference. 
The case of Fox vs. Lavender, supra, involved an 
action brought against a wife riding in an automobile 
owned by the husband and wife for injuries arising out 
of an accident which occurred while the automobile was 
being driven by the husband on an errand for the wife. 
Even under those facts the court held that the question 
of whether or not the wife was responsible was for the 
injury, and in so holding said "That the fact that the 
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wife was a joint owner, or the fact that the husband 
and wife had a common destination, did not in and of 
itself make it a joint venture." 
The fact that Child and Hardman were not in joint 
possession of the automobile at the time of the accident 
is important in determining whether Hardman had the 
right to control the vehicle. Judge \Volfe in the Fox vs. 
Lavender opinion makes some further interesting eom-
ments on the law of joint venture. He quotes from Cole-
man vs. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 12-1 Atl. 224: 
"What sort of an arrangement will make 
the parties to it joint adventurers in the operation 
of a vehicle in which all are riding is well settled. 
A typical case is where two or more jointly hire 
a vehicle for their common purpose and agree 
that one of their number shall drive it. In such 
a case the possession of the vehicle is joint and 
each has an equal right to control its operation. 
The better considered cases hold that sueh com-
mon possession and common right of control, re-
sulting in common responsibility for negligent 
failure to control are the earmarks of the legal 
relation of a joint adventure in the operation of 
a vehicle." · 
The Restatenzeut of the Law of Torts, Yol. 2, Sec. 
491, states the effect of joint enterprise on contributory 
negligence a:-; follows : 
"AnY one of several persons engaged in an 
enterprise is barred from reroYery against a negli-
gent defendant by the contributory negligence of 
any other of them if the enterprise is so far joint 
that each me1nber of the group is responsible to 
the third person injured by the negligence of 
fellow members." 
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Could it be contended reasonably that if the defend-
Lt Hardman had collided with the automobile in which 
.e plaintiff was riding, that the defendant Child would 
tve joint liability with Hardman for the operation of 
le latter's vehicle~ The situation as shown by the evi-
mce seems to compel a negative answer. 
The transaction between Hardman and Child was 
)mplete before they left Tooele. The only further inter-
;t which Hardman had in the matter was to obtain 
[s money from Child when they reached Sunset. The 
efendant Hardn1an had no control or right to control 
1e actions of the defendant Child who had purchased 
1e vehicle and was therefore the owner in possession 
f the same with the full right to control it. He was not 
n employee of Hardman and Hardman had no right 
> direct his activities. It is true they had agreed on a 
)mmon destination, but this fact alone does not give 
Lse to any relationship of principal and agent. Even 
~it is assumed the sale was not complete and that Hard-
tan was still the owner of the vehicle, he would not 
e responsible for the actions of Child, either as a pros-
ective purchaser or on some theory of joint venture, 
s the liability in either of these situations requires the 
hysical presence of the owner of the vehicle in the 
ehicle being driven. Otherwise, the right of control 
ver the actions of the person driving the automobile 
ecomes a meaningless thing for the reason that the 
wner is in no position to exercise that right. It is true 
1at in the case of master and servant the actions of 
1e servant are those of the master even though the 
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Inaster Inay not be present at the time the acts are p€r-
forrned, provided the servant is acting within the scope: 
of his employment. This principle of law is not appli- ·. 
cable to the situation of bailor and bailee, which is actu- , 
ally the relationship which existed here if the sale be-
tween Child and Hardman was not complete before 
commencing their return trip to Sunset. 
The case of Galarowicz vs. Ward, 230 P. 2d 576, 
119 rtah 611, again affirms the rule of the earlier Utah 
decisions that the ownership of an automobile by one 
person and use by another raises no presumption of 
agency even though the use is by members of the same 
family as the owner. Says the court: 
"* * * Plaintiff asks that we reconsider the 
rule as it now exists in this state, that ownership 
of an automobile b~~ one person and use by an-
other raises no presumption of agency. In this 
regard, his counsel review for us the cases de-
veloping the rule and solicit its abrogation. See 
Ferguson v. \Yinter, -!6 l 1tah 321. 150 P. 299; 
McFarlane v. \Yinters, -!7 Ftah 598, 155 P. 437, 
L.R.A. 1916D, 618; Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Ptah 
583, 176 P. 267 and Saltas v. ~lffleck, 99 Ftah 65, 
102 P. 2d 493, for cases developing this rule. The 
principle has been considered even 1nore recently 
however, in the ease of Conklin v. \Yalsh. 1948, 
113 rtah 27G. 193 P. ~d -!37. -!-!0. 
''In this latter case, Dr. Conklin sued \Yalsh 
for damag-es to his aut01nobile arising out of a,. 
collision he tween the \Y alsh car and the Conklin] 
car, being driven by ~Irs. Conklin. The trial court 
directed a verdict for the plaintiff and held that 
l\1 rs. Conklin waf' not the agent or servant of 
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her husband and therefore her negligence was 
not imputable to him. The court said: 'That there 
is no presumption of agency between husband 
.and wife in the operation of an automobile merely 
because of the marriage relationship has been 
fully decided by this court in the case of Fox v. 
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 1049 (1053), 
109 A.L.R. 105.' The court then quotes from the 
Fox v. Lavender opinion, in part, as follows: 
'* * * The other line of authorities which hold 
that no presumption arises that the driver of the 
car is the .agent of the owner where the owner 
is not present are found listed in Berry on Auto-
mobiles, supra, p. 1172, Sec. 1359, Utah falls 
within this class. (citing cases) In this jurisdic-
tion this is the case even- though a me1nber of 
the family is driving. * * *' The court, in Conklin 
v. Walsh, then concluded: 'The fact that in this 
case the wife was in the act of taking the daughter 
to her music lesson at the time * * * does not 
establish agency between herself and her husband 
who was the owner of the car. Since the record 
discloses no other evidence of such a relationship, 
the trial judge when he determined that Mrs. 
Conklin was negligent correctly held that her 
negligence w.as not imputable to him.'" 
It is submitted that the evidence on the relationship 
~tween Hardman and Child was undisputed and the 
aestion of whether Hardman was responsible for Child's 
egligence was for the court and not for the jury. That 
1e plaintiff as a matter of law failed to sustain the 
arden of proving that Hardman was the agent or 
~rvant of the defendant Child. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS BY SUB-
MITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH WERE NOT 8UP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND BY FAILING AND RE. 
FUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDAN'I 
HARDMAN'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
Number 19 of the Court's instructions to the jury 
reads as follows: 
"No liability can be imposed upon defendant, 
Arthur Hardman, unless you shall find from a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
" (a) That, at the time of the accident, 
Arthur Hardman was the owner of the pickup 
truck; 
"(b) That Kathan Child was driving the 
truck as an agent or employee of Arthur Hard-
man, on behalf of and for the benefit of Arthur 
Hardman, and not on his own behalf or for pur-
poses of his own; 
" (c) That, in operating said truck, the de-
fendant Child was negligent; and 
" (d) That such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 
"And, if you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence earh of the above propositions (a), 
(b), (c), and (d), Arthur Hardman would be, 
liable to the plaintiff, and you should so find. 1 
"But if You do not find each and all of said 
four pro~ositions, then Arthur Hardman is not 
liable and your verdict should be in favor of de-
fendant, Arthur Hard1nan, and against the plain-
tiff, 'No Cause of Action.'" 
At the rlof'e of the evidence the defendant Hardman 
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excepted to this instruction upon the ground th.at there 
was no evidence to go to the jury on the issue of 
whether Hardman was responsible for the manner in 
which Child drove the vehicle or that the relationship 
of master and servant or principal and agent existed 
between the two. This exception was taken upon the 
grounds mentioned in the .argument under Point I (R. 
421-422). Defendant further excepted to the instruction 
upon the grounds that it permitted the jury to find 
whether Hardman was the owner of the pickup truck 
without defining for them, either in this instruction or 
elsewhere, the meaning of ownership as contemplated 
by law. Also, that in sub-paragraph (b) of the instruc-
tion the issue of whether or not Child was the agent of 
H.ardman, upon the ground that there was no instruc-
tion in the finding or informing the jury of his Requested 
Instructions, neither of which were given by the court 
as requested or in substance even though the court's 
notes indicate that No. 6 was "covered another way," 
(R. 31) and No. 6C was "substance given" (R. 35). 
Defendant Hardman's Requested Instruction No. 6A, 
which re.ads: 
"DEFENDANT HARD~1AN'S 'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6A 
"You are instructed that under the law of 
this state title to personal property passes at the 
time the parties to the contract intend it to be 
transferred and unless a different intention 
appears title pas.ses to a purchaser when the con-
tract of purchase is made, and it is immaterial 
whether the time of payment or the time of de-
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l~very, or both, is postponed. If therefore, you 
f1nd from the evidence that at Tooele, Utah, de-
fertdant Child, after an inspection of the truck 
at the Barrus Motor Company place of business, 
expressed his satisfaction with it and said he 
would buy it and would pay $650 as the purchase:] 
price; that is to say, that he would deliver to 
Hardman an old car for a credit of $100 and pay 
the balance of $500 when the parties returned from 
Tooele to Sunset, Davis County; and if you fur-· 
ther find that Hardman paid Barrus Motor Com-
pany of Tooele for the truck and delivered the 
same to Child pursuant to said agreement and 
that Child was driving the same at the time of the 
accident, then you are instructed that at the time 
of the accident Child and not Hardman was the 
owner of the car and Hardman was not respon-
sible for its operation and your verdict should 
be for defendant Hardman." 
sets out the law on the issue of whether the ownership 
or title to the autmnobile passed to Child based upon 
the defendant Hardn1an 's theory of the rase even though 
the evidence disclosed the purchase price "·as $650 plus 
Child's old ear, $150 of which would haYe heen payable 
in 90 da~·~ (R. ~()-~1). 
The defendant Arthur H ard1nan requested the court 
to instrnrt the jury on the control factor in Instruction 
No. fi, wh ieh re.ads: 
.. INSTRrCTIOX NO. 6 
•· You are instructed that the negligence of a 
driver of an autmnobile cannot be ilnputed to 
another person, except in the case where the 
driver is the e1nployee of such person, unless the 
other person is present at the time the negligent 
acts a rf' con1nli tteed and p.a rtiei pates in or ex-
erC'.ises C'.ontrol over the operation of the auto-
~2 
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~ 
~: 
I•, mobile or has the right to exercise such control 
t even though he does not do so. This is true even 
if such other person is the owner of the auto-
mobile. If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the defendant Nathan Child was not an 
employee of Arthur Hardman and that prior to 
the accident in this case the defendant Hardman 
had surrendered the control and custody of the 
International pickup truck to the defendant 
Nathan Child and that the defendant Arthur 
Hardman exercised no control over or had no 
right to control the actions of the defendant 
Nathan Child, then the defendant Arthur Hard-
man cannot be held liable for the negligent actions 
of Nathan Child. 
Requested only if K o. 5 is refused." 
and Instruction No. 6C, which reads : 
"DEFENDANT HARD~1AN'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6C 
"You are instructed that whether one person 
is agent of another depends upon right of con-
trol of one over another, and if you find from the 
evidence that after delivering the truck to Child 
at Tooele Hardman had no control or right of 
control over the operation of the vehicle and that 
it was not being driven by Child for or on behalf 
of Hardman, then you are instructed that Child 
was not the agent of Hardman at the time of the 
accident and your verdict must be for the defend-
ant Hardman.'' 
The defendant's Requested Instruction ~ o. 6C ~et~ 
out the necessity for the element of control for the rela-
tionship of principal and agent to exist and No. 6B, which 
reads: 
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"DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6B 
"You are instructed that there can be no 
liability on the part of defendant Hardman unless 
you find that at the time of the accident defendant 
Child was the agent of Hardman in operating the 
truck. Therefore, if you find that before leaving 
Tooele to return to Sunset, Hardman and Child 
had agreed upon the price Child was to pay for 
the truck and that Child had declared he would 
buy it, and if you further find that Hardman 
paid Barrus Motor Company for the truck .and 
then delivered it to Child, who had agreed to pay 
for the truck upon arrival at Sunset, Davis 
County; and if you further find that the accident 
occurred while Child was driving the truck on 
the return trip to Sunset, then you are instructed 
that in operating said truck Child was not the 
agent of Hardman, and your verdict should be 
for defendant Hardman." 
applies to the evidence in accordance with the defendant 
Hardman's theory of the case. 
Instruction No. 7 A, which reads : 
"DEFENDANT HARDl\fAN'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 A 
"You are instructed that where the owner of 
a vehicle delivers it to a prospective purchaser 
who, unaccompanied by the seller, operates the 
same and negligently injures or causes damage to 
another person, the seller is not liable for the 
negligent act of such prospective purchaser. 
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that in 
driving the truck from Tooele defendant Child 
was merely a prospective purchaser thereof and 
34 
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that Child was negligent in operating said truck, 
and if you further find that he was unaccompanied 
by defendant Hardman and that because of Child's 
negligence the plaintiff sustained damage, then 
you are instructed that such negligence of Child 
cannot be imputed to the defendant Hardman 
and your verdict should be for said defendant 
Hardman." 
covers the issue of whether the owner of a vehicle is 
liable for the negligence of a prospective purchaser, 
which was .an issue for the jury if the sale was not com-
pleted between Hardman and Child before they com-
menced the return trip from Tooele. 
A consideration of the Court's Instructions as given 
and the failure to give the foregoing Requested Instruc-
tions of the defendant Hardman resulted in the jury not 
being instructed on his theory of the case. 
This matter is controlled by the decision of this 
Court in Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834, 
which reaffirmed the fundamental principle that it is the 
duty of the court to cover the theories of all parties 
in his instructions. 
The court in his Instruction No. 23 instructed the 
jury as follows in the second paragraph thereof: 
"In determining the amount of such damages, 
you .are instructed that you should consider the 
pain and suffering that the plaintiff has endured, 
if any, both mental and physical, as a result of 
such negligence, ever since he sustained his 
injuries, and that he will probably endure in the 
future." 
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Defendant excepted to the last part of the last sentence 
in this paragraph upon the grounds that it was unsup-
ported by the evidence in that there was no evidence 
that the plaintiff would experience pain and suffering 
in the future (R. 423). In fact, the evidence was to the 
effect that he had m.ade a full recovery. 
Defendant Hardman also excepted to submitting the 
issue of the loss of bodily function in the last paragraph 
of said instruction for the same reason. This phrase, 
which reads "'loss of bodily function" (R. -1-23--1-2-±), is 
crossed out in Instruction 23, but it is defendant's recol-
lection that the instruction was submitted to the jury 
in its entirety including the words "loss of bodily func-
tion." This instruction is contradictory to Instruction 
No. 21B and would certainly confuse a jury inasmuch as 
in the latter instruction the jury was told that there 
was no evidence that plaintiff had sustained permanent 
loss of bodily function. The giving of contradictory 
instructions is error. Knold vs. Rio Grande Trestenz Ry., 
21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021; Jensen vs. rtalz Ry., 72 rtah 
366, 270 P. 349. 
Defendant also excepted to the Court's Instruction 
No. 14 relating to the issue on whether or not the de-
fendant Nathan Child was negligent in driving said 
pickup when he knew, or should haYe known, there was 
some defect in the tire and tubes, upon the grounds 
that there was no evidence to support the question of 
whether Child knew, or should have known, under the 
cirrmnstanees, that said defect existed before the accident 
and that considering said instruction in connection with 
B6 
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Court's Instruction No. 19, the issue is submitted as to 
whether Hardman was .also responsible for any knowl-
edge of Child of the defect existing in the truck (R. 421-
422), and for the same reason Hardman excepted to the 
Court's Instruction No. 20 (R. 423). · 
It is often difficult for judges and lawyers to apply 
the law to fact situations involving questions of agency 
and master and servant, witness the plethora of conflict-
ing decisions on the subjects in the various jurisdictions. 
How can a jury of laymen be expected to do so without 
adequate instruction on the nature and elements neces-
sary to establish such relationships~ 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant Hardman was not in the pickup truck. 
Child had accepted it, .and Hardman's only concern 
was in receiving the purchase price or in arrange-
ments for payment when they returned to Sunset. 
Therefore, the only theory upon which he could be held 
liable for Child's negligence would be under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior, which the evidence indisputably 
shows did not exist. The purchase price was agreed on 
before leaving Tooele and if the transaction is governed 
by the intention of Hardman and Child, the sale, other 
than payment, was complete at that time, and Hardman 
had no right to control the manner in which Child 
drove the vehicle. If not, Child's status was that of a 
prospective purchaser, and a bailee. However, the law 
in this state does not extend liability to an owner who 
does not have the right of control during the trip, 
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although he is interested in arrival at the ultimate 
destination. If we are correct in this proposition, error 
in the instruction is moot, in any event there is nothing 
further to add to our contentions that the instructions 
were erroneous. 
We respectfully submit that the verdict in this case 
should be set aside and a judgment of K o Cause of Action 
entered in favor of the defendant Arthur Hardman, or in 
the alternative, that he be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Arthur Hardman 
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